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BETTER LUCK NEXT TIME, CONGRESS: THE SUPREME
COURT INTERPRETS § 1367 SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION IN EXXON MOBIL CORP. V.
ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC.'
Joseph Escanddn2
A nine-year-old girl injured by a can of tuna sued the manufacturer in
a diversity suit, joined by family members as co-plaintiffs.3 The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that only the injured girl
alleged damages sufficient to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement
of the statute granting diversity jurisdiction.4 Interpreting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, the court of appeals concluded that it could not exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction over the claims of the family members who did not in-
dependently meet the amount in controversy.5
In a case consolidated for appeal, 10,000 gasoline dealers alleged pric-
ing overcharges in a diversity class action against an oil company.6 Though
a named class representative alleged damages meeting the amount-in-con-
troversy requirement, other class members did not.7 Also interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1367, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it could exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiff class members who did not
allege the necessary amount in controversy. 8 Recognizing the inconsis-
tency of the approaches, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to resolve the circuit split.9 It held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 autho-
rizes supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs who do not sat-
isfy the amount-in-controversy requirement where at least one plaintiff
does and all other elements of jurisdiction are satisfied.
10
Federal courts exercise jurisdiction that is granted generally by the
Constitution, and specifically by an express congressional grant of that ju-
risdiction." For example, district courts have original jurisdiction over civil
actions between citizens of different states where there is a sufficient
1. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005). As this
issue goes to press, the pagination of Volume 545 of United States Reports is unknown, so citations for
this case will be to Supreme Court Reporter.
2. J.D. candidate 2007, Tulane University Law School; B.A. 2004, University of Washington.
The author would like to thank the Mississippi College Law Review, the Tulane Law Review, the Uni-
versity of Washington School of Law, and the University District Chipotle restaurant for making this
note possible during such interesting times.
3. Exxon Mobil Corp., 125 S. Ct. at 2616.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2615.
7. See id. at 2615-16.
8. Id. at 2616.
9. Exxon Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 924 (2004).
10. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. 2611.
11. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
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amount in controversy.12 Historically, courts have developed and enforced
a layer of interpretation of these statutory requirements.' 3 Thus, in Clark
v. Paul Gray, Inc., the Supreme Court dismissed as outside of the court's
jurisdiction all claims save that of the lone plaintiff who alleged the statu-
tory amount in controversy.' 4  The Supreme Court applied the same
"firmly rooted . . . accepted construction" of the amount-in-controversy
requirement in Zahn v. International Paper Co., dismissing a diversity class
action for lack of original jurisdiction because, though the named plaintiffs
alleged the amount in controversy, not all class members could do so. 5
Courts have also developed doctrines justifying extension of jurisdic-
tion to claims outside an express statutory grant of jurisdiction, but related
to claims within one, on the ground of judicial economy. 6 In United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, for example, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's
state-law claims, arising out of the "common nucleus of operative fact" that
gave rise to plaintiff's federal question claims against the same defendant,
were within the district court's jurisdiction.'7 The Court reasoned that the
power to exercise this pendent jurisdiction over claims that otherwise could
not be heard in a federal forum was implicit in the constitutional grant of
jurisdiction to the judiciary.' 8
In a line of cases following Gibbs, the Supreme Court distinguished
between non-federal pendent claims between two parties already properly
within the jurisdiction of the district court, as in Gibbs, and cases involving
pendent parties in which a plaintiff asserted non-federal claims arising from
the same facts against different defendants. 9 Several of these cases cited
Zahn as an example of the insufficiency of a mere common nucleus of fact
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (granting the authority permitted under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1).
13. See, e.g., Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911) (requiring each plaintiff to
allege requisite amount in controversy); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (requiring
complete diversity between opposing parties).
14. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1939). Clark was a case grounded on federal
question jurisdiction, which at that time had an amount-in-controversy requirement. Id. at 588.
15. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95, 294-301 (1973). Zahn drew primarily
upon the authority of Clark, as well as Snyder v. Harris, 414 U.S. 291 (1969), a class action in which no
single plaintiff alleged the amount in controversy required by the statute and which also relied on
Clark. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 295-301.
16. See generally 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3523 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction);
13B id. §§ 3567-67.2 (discussing doctrine of pendent jurisdiction). The Supreme Court has noted that
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are "two species of the same generic problem." Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978).
17. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
18. See id.
19. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (finding no pendent jurisdiction over state-
law claims against defendants arising out of airplane crash when federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over plaintiff's claims under Federal Tort Claims Act and pendent parties are nondiverse); Kroger,
437 U.S. 365 (finding no pendent jurisdiction over claims asserted against third-party defendant when
no diversity existed between plaintiff and pendent party); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (find-
ing no pendent jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law claims against county when county was excepted
from suit under civil rights statute).
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giving rise to both jurisdictionally sufficient and deficient claims in justify-
ing jurisdiction over additional parties not otherwise subject to federal ju-
risdiction, without express statutory approval.20 The last case in this line,
Finley v. United States, noted that Congress was free to create a statutory
basis to permit district courts to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction.21
Congress, dissatisfied with the outcome in Finley, complied. 22 Catego-
rizing both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under a new name, Congress
enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute.23 Subsection (a) of § 1367
grants jurisdiction over related claims whenever the district courts have
original jurisdiction over a civil action, and the second sentence of subsec-
tion (a) explicitly permits such exercise over additional parties.24 Subsec-
tion (b) retracts that supplemental jurisdiction from certain classes of
parties claiming diversity as the basis of the district court's original jurisdic-
tion .2  Though all authorities agree that § 1367 successfully overruled Fin-
ley,2 6 the question of the continued viability of Clark and Zahn has not
produced a similar consensus.
The legislative history of § 1367 itself manifests some confusion over
whether the statute overruled Clark and Zahn. The subcommittee that
considered supplemental jurisdiction and the impact of Finley drafted a
statute very similar to that eventually enacted by Congress, and contended
that its proposal would overrule Zahn.28 However, the House of Repre-
sentatives appeared to take the stance that its version of the statute would
20. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 372. See also Finley, 490 U.S. at 549-50 (citing Zahn as analytically
distinct from Gibbs, and noting that Zahn did not mention Gibbs). In fact, Zahn neither mentioned
Gibbs nor addressed the possible application of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction to the deficient plain-
tiff's claims, 414 U.S. at 291-302, though the dissent urged an application of ancillary jurisdiction. Id. at
305-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
22. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 27-28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6873-74.
23. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14 (1990)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)). Section 1367 provides in part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by
Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdic-
tion shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely
on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under
subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as
plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of
such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
26. See, e.g., Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 134 (1st Cir. 2004).
27. See, e.g., id. at 132-33 (summarizing circuit split).
28. REPORT TO THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrITEE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE
ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE STATES 567-68, 561 n.3 (Mar. 12, 1990),
reprinted in FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS
(July 1, 1990). In a brief statement in its report, the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended
that Congress create supplemental jurisdiction but did not comment on the impact of that enactment on
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preserve Zahn.29 In addition, participants in the drafting of the statute ap-
parently acknowledged the possible divergence between the intended ef-
fect on Zahn and the actual result accomplished by the text.3"
The academic debates over whether § 1367 overruled Clark and Zahn
have been lively.3' Proponents typically fall into two camps. Some argue
that the statute plainly overrules them and that an appeal to legislative
history is unnecessary and unhelpful.32 Those arguing that § 1367 leaves
them intact typically point to the legislative history as indicative of how the
statute should be applied regardless of the text,33 or that the text of the
statute itself can support an interpretation that preserves Zahn.34
The debate over the viability of Zahn in light of § 1367 has been
equally boisterous in the courts. 35 Appellate courts reading the statute as
permitting exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs
who fail to allege the requisite amount in controversy have done so uni-
formly on the basis of the plain, unambiguous meaning of the text of the
statute.36 On the other hand, appellate courts reading the statute as pre-
serving Clark and Zahn, while not uniformly reading the statute as ambigu-
ous, have nonetheless placed greater emphasis on legislative history.37
Zahn. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrITTEE
47-48 (Apr. 2, 1990) (noting that the report of the subcommittee "contains additional material on this
subject").
29. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875 (stating "[sub-
section (b)] is not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only
class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley" and citing Zahn in a footnote).
30. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Juris-
diction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 960 n.90 (1991). "It would have been better
had the statute dealt explicitly with this problem, and the legislative history was an attempt to correct
the oversight." Id.
31. See Richard D. Freer, The Cauldron Boils: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Amount in Contro-
versy, and Diversity of Citizenship Class Actions, 53 EMORY L.J. 55, 56-58 (2004); James E. Pfander,
Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
109, 110 n.3 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 31, at 66-86.
33. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 30, at 960 n.90.
34. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 31, at 127-53.
35. See, e.g., Russ v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 808, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(stating that finding the plain language of § 1367 to overrule Clark and Zahn is a "message from us in
the judicial branch to [Congress] [saying] 'Gotcha! And better luck next time."').
36. See Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 2004) (statute unambiguously over-
rules Zahn); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1254-56 (11th Cir. 2003) (same);
Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 117-119 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d
927, 934-940 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d
599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930-31
(7th Cir. 1996) (statute unambiguously overrules Clark); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.
1995), affd by an equally divided court, 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (statute unambiguously overrules Zahn).
Some of these courts studied the legislative history and acknowledged that overruling Zahn may have
been an unintentional mistake by Congress, but nonetheless refused to abandon the plain meaning of
the statute. See Gibson, 261 F.3d at 938-40.
37. See Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 131-44 (1st Cir. 2004) (text of statute,
plainly read and corroborated by legislative history, can be read to preserve Clark); Trimble v. Asarco,
Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 959-62 (8th Cir. 2000) (ambiguities in statute warrant consideration of legislative
history that justifies preservation of Zahn); Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214,
218-22 (3rd Cir. 1999) (ambiguity in statute warrants resort to legislative history and preservation of
Clark and Zahn); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 640-41 (10th Cir. 1998) (purporting to read
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A few resources are available as ammunition for any attempted inter-
pretation of § 1367. First, the statute governing federal jurisdiction over
removed cases contains threshold language similar to that found in
§ 1367(a).38 In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, the
Supreme Court held that a subset of federal-question claims was sufficient
to put the civil action within the original jurisdiction of the district courts,
allowing supplemental jurisdiction to attach to related state-law claims
against the same defendant.39 Thus, in at least one context, the Court has
found "original jurisdiction of the district courts" to be present when some
but not all claims satisfy a statute granting jurisdiction.4"
Also relevant are various canons of statutory interpretation. Propo-
nents of either interpretation can assert precedent in favor of their respec-
tive interpretations; those arguing the unambiguous overruling of Clark
and Zahn can point to the "preeminent canon" that "inquiry begins with
the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous."4 1
Those arguing for an interpretation incorporating the Clark and Zahn rule
can point to the assumption that Congress "legislate[s] against [a] back-
ground of law, scholarship, and history.
42
In the noted case, the Supreme Court of the United States read the
text of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in light of its structure and context as unambigu-
ously overruling Zahn and Clark, and saw no need to resort to legislative
history.43 The Court narrowly framed the question in terms of whether a
court has the original jurisdiction required by § 1367 for exercise of supple-
mental jurisdiction over related claims in a diversity case where at least one
plaintiff satisfies the amount in controversy, and concluded that a district
court does have original jurisdiction over such an action. 44 The Court then
discussed and dismissed several arguments that such actions fall outside the
original jurisdiction of the district courts.45 The Court also responded to an
objection that its interpretation was inconsistent with the implications of
§ 1367(b). 46 Finally, after reaching its conclusion, the Court declared un-
necessary any resort to legislative history, but conducted just such an exam-
ination as a cautionary exercise demonstrating the weaknesses of those
resources.
47
§ 1367 as unambiguously preserving Zahn, but citing legislative history as supportive of that
conclusion).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (stating "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction[ ] may be removed ....
39. City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-66 (1997).
40. See id.
41. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004).
42. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 169 (2004).
43. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2620-21, 2625 (2005).
44. Id. at 2620-21.
45. See id. at 2621-24.
46. Id. at 2625.
47. See id. at 2625-27.
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After restating the law of supplemental jurisdiction and the Clark and
Zahn interpretations of the amount-in-controversy requirement as they ex-
isted prior to the passage of § 1367, the Court examined the statutory re-
quirements for any exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.48 The Court
concluded that a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action
consisting of the claim of the plaintiff who sufficiently alleges the amount in
controversy, regardless of the sufficiency of that allegation by other plain-
tiffs.49 The original jurisdiction over that plaintiff's claim satisfies the
threshold condition of § 1367(a) and allows exercise of supplemental juris-
diction over related claims, including claims of plaintiffs failing to satisfy
the amount in controversy.50 The Court found further support for its inter-
pretation in the structure of § 1367, noting that § 1367(b) removes supple-
mental jurisdiction from specific categories of parties in diversity suits, but
that Rule 20 plaintiffs and Rule 23 plaintiff class members are not so
enumerated. 1
The Court then considered and rejected arguments challenging its in-
terpretation that a district court has original jurisdiction over a diversity
action when at least one but not every plaintiff alleges a sufficient amount
in controversy.52 First, the Court dismissed the theory that an entire civil
action is outside a district court's original jurisdiction if a single claim is
jurisdictionally deficient, reasoning that any deficient claims intended to be
encompassed by § 1367(a) would defeat the statutory precondition and
prevent supplemental jurisdiction from ever being exercised, overruling
even Gibbs.53
Next, the Court rejected an argument that a single claim failing to al-
lege the necessary amount in controversy "contaminates" the other suffi-
cient claims in a civil action and defeats any original jurisdiction over the
whole, observing that such an interpretation is not justified by policy in the
amount-in-controversy context, because one plaintiff's failure to present a
claim of sufficient gravity does not diminish the significance of the claim of
the plaintiff who does.5 4 Finally, the Court noted that either argument fails
48. See id. at 2616-20. In its discussion of the history of pendent jurisdiction, the Court noted a
difference between analysis of complete diversity as required by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, in which the
presence of any nondiverse parties on opposing sides will defeat original jurisdiction over the entire
action, and analysis of other statutory requirements for federal jurisdiction, such as the amount in con-
troversy or existence of a federal question, which the Court noted could be analyzed for sufficiency
claim-by-claim, without reference to the remainder of the action. See id. at 2617-18.
49. Id. at 2620-21.
50. Id. The Court asserted this conclusion as an obvious and inevitable logical consequence of
the statutory language, and cited no authority for its interpretation. See id.
51. Id. at 2621.
52. Id. at 2621-24.
53. See id. at 2621-22. The Court emphasized the inconsistency of this argument with accepted
legal practice as well, noting that courts routinely fix jurisdictional defects by dismissing individual
parties rather than entire actions. Id. at 2622 (citing Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1938)).
The Court also declined to limit this "indivisibility theory" to diversity jurisdiction and not federal-
question jurisdiction, finding no textual basis in § 1331 and § 1332 for the distinction. Id. at 2622.
54. Id. Thus, the claim of the plaintiff who successfully alleged the amount in controversy would
still validly be within the original jurisdiction of the district court, and supplemental jurisdiction could
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to address the similar reading of "original jurisdiction" in federal removal
jurisdiction, where comparable statutory language in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) is
satisfied by a civil action in which only a subset of claims satisfy federal
jurisdictional requirements.
The Court also responded to the charge that its interpretation pro-
duces an "anomaly" in the jurisdictional retractions in § 1367(b). 6 The
Court acknowledged the peculiarity of the exclusion of supplemental juris-
diction over plaintiffs proposed to be joined under Rule 19, in light of the
Court's holding that supplemental jurisdiction can be exercised over per-
missively joined plaintiffs under Rule 20.17 However, the Court reversed
the argument and observed that if the district courts had no original juris-
diction in a diversity case where a single plaintiff's claims did not satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement, then any mention of Rule 19 plaintiffs
who did not meet those requirements would be superfluous.58 Having thus
confronted and answered every objection to its interpretation of the stat-
ute, the Court reiterated its initial statement of the issue and held that the
plain reading of § 1367 overrules the rule stated in Clark and Zahn.59
As an aside, the Court also responded to the argument that § 1367 is
ambiguous and requires interpretation in light of its legislative history.60
The Court denied the existence of any ambiguity in the statute, but none-
theless discussed the legislative history to demonstrate the dangers inher-
ent in applying it to an interpretation of § 1367.61 First, the Court noted
the dubious value of the "murky" legislative history, pointing to conflicts
between statements in the drafting subcommittee report and the House
Committee Report regarding the fate of Zahn under the statute.62 Next,
the Court cited the statements of some of the statute's drafters as danger-
ous post-hoc attempts to alter the meaning of the statute's text in an end
attach to other claims. See id. On the other hand, the Court found the "contamination theory" ger-
mane to the complete-diversity determination, because the presence of nondiverse opposing parties
alleviates the worry of potential bias in a state forum and removes the need to hear every claim in the
federal forum. See id. Thus, under the Court's interpretation, § 1367 does not allow supplemental
jurisdiction to bypass the complete-diversity requirement. See id. The Court found no authority in the
fact that the diversity and the amount-in-controversy requirements are grounded in § 1332 for applying
the contamination theory to both. Id. at 2622.
55. Id. at 2622-23 (citing City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997) (allowing
removal on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction over some claims in the civil action and exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims)).
56. Id. at 2624.
57. See id. (noting the possibility of an "unintentional drafting gap") (citing Meritcare Inc. v. St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Corp., 166 F.3d 214, 221 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1999)).
58. Id. ("Though the omission of Rule 20 plaintiffs from § 1367(b) presents something of a puz-
zle on our view of the statute, the inclusion of Rule 19 plaintiffs in this section is at least as difficult to
explain under the alternative view.").
59. Id. at 2625.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2625-27.
62. Id. (contrasting REPORT TO THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIrEE OF THE SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE STATES 561 n.33 (Mar. 12,
1990), reprinted in FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE RE-
PORTS (July 1, 1990), with H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 27, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875).
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run around the legislative process. 63 The Court concluded by stating that
even if resort to the legislative history were warranted, it provided no basis
for altering the Court's interpretation of the plain meaning of the statute.'
The noted case provoked two dissents.65 Justice Stevens attempted to
rehabilitate the legislative history, recasting the majority's criticisms of the
murkiness and suspiciousness of the available resources as evidence of the
ambiguity of § 1367.66 Though he offered no alternative interpretation,
Justice Stevens did assert that his account of the legislative history sup-
ported Justice Ginsburg's alternative interpretation.67
The alternative interpretation offered by Justice Ginsburg preserved
the rule of Clark and Zahn.68 Drawing heavily on the First Circuit's rea-
soning in Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. ,69 the dissent argued for a nar-
rower interpretation of the § 1367(a) original jurisdiction threshold that
incorporates the interpretations of the § 1332 requirements as they existed
when the statute was enacted. 71 Justice Ginsburg emphasized the conser-
vatism of her approach, when compared with the majority's, in preserving
those traditional interpretations, and also argued that her reading would
more closely align with the removal statute.
71
The noted case might come to stand for the proposition that bad stat-
utes make for bad case law. As Justice Ginsburg was willing to grant, both
the majority and dissent offer plausible readings of the statutory text, 72 but
neither approach is wholly satisfactory in coping with a statute generally
agreed to have been poorly drafted.73 The Court's "contamination" theory
prevents its account of § 1367 from abolishing the rule of complete diver-
sity, but the Court offers no completely satisfactory basis for rejecting the
application of that theory to the Clark and Zahn requirements for indepen-
dent fulfillment of the amount in controversy.74 The dissent, on the other
hand, requires reading into a statute labeled "supplemental jurisdiction"
63. Id. at 2627 (referring to Rowe, supra note 30, at 960 n.90).
64. Id. The Court also briefly raised the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No.
109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), but attributed no weight to its passage, on the basis of its lack of retroactivity
and the irrelevance of its recent enactment to the enactment of § 1367 fifteen years earlier. Id. at
2627-28.
65. Id. at 2628-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2631-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 2628-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2637-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2004).
70. Exxon Mobil Corp., 125 S. Ct. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thus, Strawbridge and
Clark would have to be satisfied before a district court could have original jurisdiction over a diversity
action and before any supplemental jurisdiction could attach. Id.
71. Id. at 2638-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73. E.g., Freer, supra note 31, at 59-60.
74. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 125 S. Ct. at 2622. The Court ignores the possibility that the
amount-in-controversy requirement is intended to insure that the increase in judicial workload from the
claims of additional plaintiffs ought to be justified only by a corresponding increase in the overall grav-
ity of the suit, in which case the policy of the amount-in-controversy requirement would justify applying
the "contamination" theory. In a sense, the Court assumes the opposite of the policy underlying the
Clark rule, and therefore concludes that Clark must have been overruled. See id.
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the entire convoluted history of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction,75 an
outcome that is at least awkward, if not masochistic. Furthermore, the dis-
sent's appeal to the operation of § 1441 is no more convincing than that of
the majority.76
If the preferability of either holding is mainly the product of one's
particular stance on the value of legislative history, then both the Court
and the dissent are preaching to the choir. From a strictly consequentialist
perspective, however, the majority's interpretation of § 1367 seems less dis-
ruptive. The Court's interpretation of supplemental jurisdiction simplifies
the application of the former doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdic-
tion, which the dissent would rather preserve intact in all their arcane
glory.77 Furthermore, in light of the Class Action Fairness Act, 8 the
Court's expansive reading of supplemental jurisdiction meshes well with
contemporary lowering of barriers to complex litigation in federal forums.
And finally, perhaps the majority's conviction that § 1367 is totally unam-
biguous will prompt Congress to choose its words more carefully the next
time it dabbles in judicial jurisdiction.
75. See id. at 2638, 2638 n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 2369 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This refers to the requirements of § 1441, which
imply that in order to maintain removal jurisdiction, the entire action at the time of removal could have
been filed in federal court. This notion presupposes the interpretation of supplemental jurisdiction
that it seeks to support.
77. See id. at 2368.
78. Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).

